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Abstract: This paper presents a new on-line cash check 
scheme which guarantees payor anonymity and improves 
upon existing similar schemes in efficiency and security. 
1. rntroduction 
Electronic commerce, which combines the effi- 
ciency of computerization a d networking, is going to dramat- 
ically change the way in which business is conducted today. 
One of the key issues for the realization of electronic om- 
merce is how payments be done in a secure, anonymous, and 
efficient manner [9]: 
l Security: The bank, the customer and the merchant have 
different security requirements. The bank wants to pre- 
vent illegal creation, copying, and reuse of electronic 
money; the customer wants to prevent loss of electronic 
money because of eavesdropping or interception; and the 
merchant wants to make sure that the electronic money 
he receives is genuine and fresh. 
. Anonymity: In the current cashless payment systems 
(such as check and credit card systems), banks could eas- 
ily observe who pays what amount (and sometimes for 
what purpose) to whom and when. With the increasing 
digitization of payment systems and with the rapid emer- 
gence of a virtual marketplace, compiling dossiers on 
individual’s spending patterns and whereabouts will 
become asy. Measures of law and jurisdiction alone are 
insufficient o prevent collection and use of these data, 
since infringements can hardly be discovered and restora- 
tion of privacy is impossible in most cases [2]. Hence, 
electronic payment systems, guaranteeing full privacy of 
payments are necessary. This implies that the payments 
of a customer are untraceable, ven if the bank and the 
merchant collude. 
l Micropayment: It is generally believed that a fairly large 
portion of transactions will be of low value, ranging from 
payments of a few cents (for accessing on-line newspa- 
pers, magazines, and electronic holiday brochures, etc.) 
to payment of a few dollars (for receiving video-on- 
demand services and computer games). Efficient payment 
kmksion to make digikdtl~nrd copies of all or part of this mnterinl for 
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systems incurring low transaction costs are highly desir- 
able. 
Numerous protocols for electronic payment have 
been proposed in recent years [e. g., l-10,12,14]. One way of 
classifying such systems is based on whether theiy require on- 
line or off-line clearing. Most of the anonymous electronic 
cash systems in recent literatures [e. g., 1, 6, 7, lo]] are off- 
line. Off-line systems in general are more scalable than on- 
line systems; however, to prevent double spending, off-line 
systems rely on tamper resistant hardware such as smart cards. 
This hardware requirment may be too costly for Internet based 
transactions. Another drawback of the tamper esistant hard- 
ware is that new technology might allow the compromise of 
such hardware, leaving users vulnerable to double spending. 
No tamper esistant devices are necessary in on-line 
payment systems. So we may term such systems as “pure soft- 
ware” solutions. Examples of on-line systems including 
Chaum’s electronic ash [3, 41 and cash checks [5], the Net- 
Cash [S], and the NetBill 1141. Chaum’s electronic ash and 
cash checks provide unconditional payor anonymity, NetCash 
provides conditional payor anonymity, and NetBill provides 
no payor anonymity. 
It is well known that operations in public key cryp- 
tosystems (PKCs) are computationally intensive. All the elec- 
tronic payment schemes mentioned above make extensive use 
of public key operations in a payment ransaction; therefore, 
they are not ideal for micropayment applications. 
The objective of this paper is to devise a payment 
scheme that satisEes the requirements of security, anonymity, 
and micropayment. To this purpose we propose a new on-line 
cash check scheme which improves upon Chaum’s on-line 
cash check scheme [5]. The security and anonymity require- 
ments are satisfied by using blind signature schemes; while the 
micropayment requirement is met by allowing a single cash 
check to be used for multiple payments between a customer 
and a merchant. 
The rest of the paper is organized as following. We 
review Chaum’s on-line cash check scheme in Section 2. We 
then introduce our scheme in Section 3. In Section 4, we first 
compare the two schemes and then informally analyze the new 
scheme against our design requirements li ted above. For easy 
of reference, notations used throughout the paper are listed in 
Figure 1. 
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K, Kx-’ The long term public/private key pair of 
party x, where x = C, or B. 
(m)k A message m signed under a private key k 
f Secure one-way hash function 
Figure 1: Notations used in the paper. 
2. Chaum’s On-Line Cash Check Scheme 
In [3, 41, Chaum et. al. proposed an electronic oin 
scheme based on blind signature which supports customer’s 
anonymity. An electronic oin is a digital signature on a ran- 
dom value, called “note number”, signed by the issuing bank. 
The coin scheme supports different ypes of coins each with a 
fixed denomination value. A drawback of the coin scheme is 
that the number of separate coins needed for a payment is in 
general the Hamming weight of the binary representation f 
the payment amount. For example, with coins of denomination 
values 1,2,4,8, and 16 cents, to pay an amount of 15 cents, 
the payor must spend a 1 cent coin, a 2 cent coin, a 4 cent coin, 
and a 8 cent coin. 
A “cookie jar” on-line cash check scheme was pre- 
sented by Chaum in [5] which achieves an average of an order 
of magnitude saving compared with the electronic coin 
scheme. As in the coin scheme, the cash check scheme is con- 
structed based on a blind version of RSA signature method 
[ll] in order to make cash checks untraceable. Moreover, it 
relies on a technique for encoding denominations in digital 
signatures (i. e., cash checks), and “devaluing” checks to the 
exact amount chosen at the time of payment. 
An example denomination scheme for Chaum’s cash 
checks is shown in Table 1, where it assigns the value of 1 cent 
to public exponent 3 in an RSA system, the value of 2 cents to 
exponent 5, 4 cents to exponent 7, and so on. Using this 
denomination scheme, a 3rd root of an image under the one- 
way function f (together with the pre-image modulo the bank’s 
RSA composite) is worth 1 cent, a 7th root is worth 4 cents, a 
21st root 5 cents, and so on. A signature on an image underf is 
“devalued” by raising it to the public powers corresponding to 
the cash values that should be removed. For example, a cash 
check having a 21st root could be devalued from its 5 cent 
value, to 1 cent, simply by raising it to the 7th power. 
Table 1: Denomination encoding scheme 
I value (cents) public exponent 
2 5 
In the example of Figure 2, two cash checks are 
withdrawn (to keep our notations compact, only residues mod- 
ulo are shown). The ei and ri are random. The ei are “note 
numbers” and the ri “blind” the images under f. The bank’s 
signature corresponds to taking the htb root, where h = 
3*5*7*11 assuming that the value of the checks are 15 cents 
each. 
Fig. 2 Cash check withdrawal in Chaum’s 
scheme 
Upon receiving message 1and identifying C (not 
explicitly shown in the figure), B signs the two received num- 
bers by taking the hrh root and returns the results to C in mes- 
sage 2. After receiving message 2from B, C divides r, out to 
obtain the cash checks (ei,flei)‘/h). 
A payment example using the first cash cheek is 
shown in Figure 3, where the merchant M is an intermcdituy 
between C and B but is not indicated explicitly. Messogcs used 
to place and to deliver purchased items are also not shown in 
the figure. To spent 5 cents at M, C raises the signature in the 
cash check to the (5.11 =) 55th power to devalue it from 15 
cents to 5 cents. The devalued cash check can be easily veri- 
fied by B to be worth 5 cents. The second residue is n blinded 
“cookie jar”, a blinded image under f of a randomly chosen 
value note number E. This cookie jar is modulo a second RSA 
composite that is only used for cookie jars. Once the bank vcr- 
itles the cash check received and that e, has not been spent 
before, it signs and returns the blinded cookie jar with public 
exponents corresponding to the change due. Upon receiving 
message 2. C divides s out to obtain the cookie jar (E, #” 
‘*‘I) which can be easily verified to be worth 10 cents. If more 
payments were to be made using the same cookie jar, all 
resulting signatures for change would accumulate. The cookie 
jar might conveniently be deposited uring the withdrawn1 of
the next batch of cash checks. 
C 
1. (e,, f(e,)J’3’7), j(E)P” 
2. 
Fig. 3 Payment in Chaum’s cheme 
3. The New Cash Check Scheme 
Our new cash check scheme is a moditlcntion to 
Chaum’s cheme. It is also constructed based on a blind RSA 
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signature method in order to make cash check payment 
untraceable. Unlike Chaurn’s scheme, however, where value 
of a cash check is encoded according to Table 1, the new 
scheme ncodes afixed check value v into a fixed RSA public 
exponent, say 3, chosen by the issuing bank B. As a result, a 
cash check in the new scheme is of the form (e, J(e)‘“). 
Another difference is that the note number e is not simply a 
random number, but a randomly selected one-time public key 
with the corresponding private key dkept by C. Refunds in the 
new scheme are collected in a cookie jar in exactly the same 
way as in Chaum’s cheme based on the denomination encod- 
ing scheme shown in Table 1, except hat the cookie jar note 
number E is a randomly selected one-time public key, instead 
of simply a random number as in Chaum’s cheme. 
We now illustrate the scheme using a simple with- 
drawal example and two payment examples. In Figure 4, C 
intends to withdraw two cash checks from B, each worth v = 
31 cents. The ri are random numbers which bliidfiei). The ei 
(note numbers) are one-time public keys randomly chosen by 
C based on a certain algorithm, such as RSA or the S&non 
signature scheme [ 131. C keeps the corresponding private keys 
di to herself. Upon receiving message 1and identifying C (not 
explicitly shown in the figure), B signs the received numbers 
by taking the 3rd root (under the cash check modulus) and 
returns the results to C in message 2. C extracts f(ei)rn from 
message 2 and stores the checks (eiJei)‘“) together with di in 
her computer or digital wallet. 
C B 
Fig. 4 Cash check withdrawal in the new 
scheme 
C keeps a cookie jar inside her computer for accu- 
mulating refunds which can then be deposited to her account 
during the next withdrawal phase. For thii purpose, C gener- 
ates a public and private key pair, denoted as E and D. based 
on a PKC, for the cookie jar she wants to keep. 
There are two options for C to spend a cash check at 
a merchant M. The first option is suitable for the case where C 
would like to have multiple shopping sessions with M using 
one cash check while the second option is suitable for the case 
where C would like to have a single shopping session per cash 
check as in Chaum’s cheme. 
Briefly, the first payment option operates as follows. 
C sends Ma cash check (e,f(e)‘“), which M forwards to B for 
checking of double spending. If no double spending is 
detected, M will establish a temporary accouti for C with a 
moxbnum spending cap equal to y the value of the cash check. 
The duration of the temporary account can be from hours to 
days or even weeks. During this period, C can place purchase 
orders at M with each order accompanied by a payment token 
signed under the one-time private key d. Any time before the 
temporary account expires, C may signal closing of the 
account by sending M a blinded cookie jar, which M forwards 
to B along with all previous received payment okens. B can 
easily verify these tokens, credits the amount of payment 
authorized by C to M’s account, puts the refund in the blinded 
cookie jar, and returns it to C. 
An illustrative procedure for the first payment 
option is shown in Figure 5, where it is assumed that C would 
like to shop using her tlrst cash check (e], flel)ln) at a mer- 
chant M. She sends the cash check in message 1to M who in 
turn forwards it to B. Once B verifies the received check and 
that el has not been spent previously, it signs and returns mes- 
sage 2 to M. M checks the authenticity of message 2 and then 
opens a temporary account for C with el as the account num- 
ber, v = 31 cents as the spending cap, and a mutually agreed 
duration (say a week) beyond which the account expires. In 
message 3, C sends her payment oken for an item she wants 
to purchase (the price negotiation messages are not shown). 
The payment oken includes the amount of payment (e. g., 4 
cents), el, and an information field II (which may include M’s 
identifier, timestamp, etc) and is signed under the private key 
dI. M verifies the payment oken using el, stores it with the 
temporary account, and then delivers the requested item in 
return. Upon receiving the item, C may close the current shop- 
ping session but leaves her account open at M. 
The next day, C may want to have another shopping 
session with M. To do this, C simply sends her payment token 
for another item in message 4. M verifies thii token and then 
replies with the requested item. Cmay continue the purchasing 
process by sending payment okens in the current session or 
new sessions anytime before the account expires. A payment 
token is accepted and requested item delivered by M as long as 
the token is valid and the spending cap v is not exceeded. 
C can close the temporary account at M any time 
before the account expires. C signals closing the account by 
sending to M the blinded cookie jar in message 5 which is then 
forwarded by M to B along with all the previously received 
payment okens. B verifies the tokens and credits M’s account 
with 4 + 10 = 14 cents. B then puts the amount of refund 3I- 4 
- 10 = 17 cents into the blinded cookie jar by computing the 
(3.13 =) 39th root offos13”3 (under the cookie jar modulus) 
and returns the result f(E)'b"3s, in message 7 to M. Upon 
reception of message 7, M closes C’s account and relays the 
message to C. C now extracts the cookie jar f(E)*""3 by 
dividing f(E) 1n’13sl with sI. She can easily verify that her 
cookie jar now is worth 17 cents. 
As stated before, the second payment option is 
designed for one shopping session per cash check. An illustra- 
tive procedure of this option is shown in Figure 6, where C 
would like to spend 26 cents using cash check (e2,fiez)1’3) at 
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Fig. 5 Payment option 1 in the new scheme 
hf. C sends to M in message 1a payment oken signed under 
d2, the cash check, and a non-empty cookie jar which has a 
value of 17 cents. M forwards the message to B for double 
spending checking and appropriate processing. Once B verifies 
that the check has not been spent before, it signs the blinded 
cookie jar (under the cookie jar modulus) with exponents cor- 
responding the change due and returns the results to hf. M then 
forwards the returned cookie jar along with the purchased item 
to c. 
The cookie jar can be used for collecting refunds 
from other purchases and might be deposited, as shown in Fig- 
ure 7, during the withdrawal of the next batch of cash checks. 
In Figure 7, the deposit message consists of the cookie jar and 
a deposit token signed under the one-time private key D. B first 
verifies the validity of the cookie jar and the deposit oken, 
makes sure that E have not been deposited before, and then 
credits C’s account with the amount contained in the cookie 
jar. 
4. Discussions 
4.1 Comparison with Chaum’s Scheme 
There are a number of differences between our 
scheme and that of Chaum’s. First, the denomination encoding 
scheme for cash checks in Chaum’s scheme is more complex 
than ours. Second, the note numbers e for cash check and E for 
cookie jar in our scheme are one-time public keys with the 
corresponding private keys d and D kept in secret by the cus- 
tomer; while note numbers in Chaum’s cheme are simply ran- 
dom numbers. Thiid, in Chaum’s cheme, in order to spend a 
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check, the amount of payment must be explicitly devalued 
from the check; while in our scheme the amount of payment is 
specified by a payment token signed under the private key d. 
As a result, our scheme has several useful features 
not found in Chaum’s cheme: 1) a cash check/cookie jar can 
only be spent/deposited by someone who knows the private 
key d/D. By keeping dlz) in secret, the check/cookie jar can bc 
sent in clear without having to worry them being seixcd by 
someone lse; 2) since a check/cookie jar can bc spent/depos- 
ited only if it is accomplished by an payment/deposit token 
signed under &D, our scheme naturally prevents the bank 
from falsely accusing the customer double spcnding/deposit- 
ing the check/cookie jar, 3) Our scheme provides two payment 
options suited for different payment/shopping scenarios. One 
option is designed for one shopping session per cash check 
and the other option allows a customer to open a temporary 
account with a merchant and then have multiple shopping ses- 
sions at the merchant. This latter option is not possible in 
Chaum’s cookie jar cash check since it requires the customer 
to devalue a cash check to the exact amount of payment before 
sending it to the merchant. 
4.2 Requirement Analysis 
l Security: Assuming that the underlying PKCs are secure, 
then it is easy to see that no one except he bank can 
issue valid cash checks and collect refunds into cookie 
jars. Moreover, due to the use of public/private key parls 
(e, a) in a cash check (e, f(e)“‘), the check can only be 
spent by the legitimate check owner, since only the 
owner can issue a payment oken signed under the pri- 
C M B 
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Fig. 6 Payment option 2 in the new scheme 
vate key d. Similarly, due to the use of public/private key 
pair (E, 0) in a cookie jar (E,fo”), the cookie jar can 
not be deposited by anyone without knowing D. Double 
spending (double deposit) of a check (cookie jar) is 
detected by on-line clearing as in Chaum’s cheme. 
C B 
1. (E,fiE)“f3*“*3’7’ ), ( C, E, timestamp} D 
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Fig. 7 Deposit of a cookie jar in the new scheme 
l Anonymity: Cash checks and refunds in cookie jars in our 
scheme are Produced based on blind RSA signature 
schemes. Following a similar argument as Chaum, it can 
be shown that he bank will not be able to trace a particu- 
lar transaction and determine the payor’s account, even 
if the bank and the merchant collude. That is, our scheme 
provides unconditional payor anonymity. It can also be 
shown that payments made by a payor using different 
cash checks are unlinkable. 
l Efliciency: Efficiency of our scheme is achieved ue to 
the following factors. Fit, only one cash check is nor- 
mally sent and verified in a payment session; while in the 
electronic oin scheme [3], to make up a specific pay- 
ment amount, the number of coins need to be payed is on 
average the H amming weight of the binary representa- 
tion of the amount. Second, processing and communica- 
tion bottleneck in an on-line payment system is the bank 
server. A basic design goal of our scheme is to minimize 
the number of on-line messages handled by the bank. 
The multiple shopping session per cash check payment 
option allows a customer to open up a temporary account 
at a merchant and then have as many shopping sessions 
with the merchant as she desires o long as the accumu- 
lated amount of payment does not exceed the cash check 
value. Only two messages per account go to the bank, 
one for detection of double spending of cash check when 
setting up the temporary account and one for refund 
when closing the account. No messages are handled by 
the bank during shopping sessions. Therefore, our 
scheme is extremely efficient when a customer makes 
repeated requests from the same merchant, There will be 
many electronic shopping scenarios in which customers 
would make repeated purchases with a merchant, such as 
in web access to electronic newspapers, image banks, 
digital libraries, networked computer games, etc. 
Assuming that a customer opens a temporary account 
using a $5 dollar cash check with an electronic newspa- 
per provider and assuming that each newspaper copy 
costs 20 cents, then the single cash check can be used for 
25 newspaper shopping sessions. Since a maximum of 
two on-line messages need to handled by the bank per 
temporary account, the number of on-line messages per 
shopping session is only 2l25 = 0.08. In certain PKCs, 
signature generation is more expensive than signature 
verification. An example of thii is RSA with small pub- 
lic exponent where signature verification is about 100 
times faster that signature generation: on a typical work- 
station, one can sign two messages per second but verify 
200 signatures per second [12]. Our cash check sheme 
can take advantage of such PKCs: a customer needs to 
perform an expensive signature generation operation 
while a merchant needs only to perform an inexpensive 
signature verification operation per payment. This 
arrangement improves ystem efficiency since the mer- 
chant rather than the customer is the system bottleneck 
in Internet based transactions. 
There are further issues need to be considered in 
practical implementations of our new scheme. Normally, gen- 
eration of public/private key pair e/d is a time consuming pro- 
cess. However, e/d do not have to be generated on-line, they 
can be pre-computed. Moreover, since e/d are used to protect a 
specific cash check, they can be selected such that cost of 
breaking the e/d based PKC exceeds the value of the cash 
check. This implies that signature generation and verification 
based on e/d can be made more computational efficient. 
The bank maintains a database of already spent note 
numbers for checking of double spending. Several techniques 
were suggested in [4] for reducing database storage require- 
ment. One of them is to have cash checks encoded with expira- 
tion dates, so that they can be purged from the bank’s list of 
spent note numbers as they expire. 
Another issue is avoiding collision of note numbers. 
If two customers choose the same note number, then only one 
of them can succeed in clearing the check, since the bank 
ensures that no note number is spent more than once. The 
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probability that any two users independently generate the 
same number uniformly at random is the well-known “birth- 
day problem”. To guard against birthday attack, the domain of 
the random chosen public key e should be sufficiently large. 
Assuming that Schnorr signature scheme is used to generate 
payment tokens. Then the private key d associated with a cash 
check is randomly chosen from Z4 and the corresponding pub- 
lic key e is given by g’ mod p, where p and q are primes such 
that ql(p - l), and where g “Zp with order q (i. e., gq= 1 modp, 
g # 1). In this case, the size of q should be sufficiently large, 
say at least 128 bits, to prevent birthday attack. 
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